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eral equilibrium model with public goods and study interventions that
have the goal of Pareto improving on the voluntary provision outcome.
Towards this end, we study a model with many private goods and non-
linear production technology for the public good, and hence allow for
relative price eﬀects to serve as a powerful channel of intervention. In
this setup we show that Pareto improving interventions generally do ex-
ist. In particular, direct government provision financed by “small”, or
“local”, lump-sum taxes can be used generically to Pareto improve upon
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1 Introduction
Most of the literature on government intervention in models of voluntary public
goods supply focuses on interventions that increase the total level of a public
good, which is considered to be underprovided. In a large class of models it
is indeed the case that the level of a public good at a voluntary contribution
equilibrium is lower than the levels associated with Pareto optima.1 Taking
that result for granted, there is a large body of literature on the “neutrality” of
government interventions that aim at increasing the total public good level in
voluntary contribution economies. Warr (1983) is the first to show that “small”
income redistributions among contributors to a public good are “neutralized”
by changes in amounts contributed in equilibrium. Consumption of the private
good and the total supply of the public good remain exactly the same as be-
fore redistribution. Warr’s neutrality result is obtained in a partial equilibrium
setting. Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986) confirm Warr’s result in a simple
general equilibrium model, and they also show that small redistributions from
non-contributing households in favor of contributing households are needed to
increase the public good level at voluntary contribution equilibria.2
However, the fact that the public good level is underprovided, in the sense
described above, does not imply that welfare of all households will be improved
by increasing the total public good provision through government intervention.
After the intervention some households may end up paying more in taxes than
the value of their original voluntary contribution, and there is no reason to
expect that the increase in the public good level will be enough to compensate
each and every one of such households. In fact, a preliminary result we present
in this paper to motivate our main analysis does show that there exist robust
examples of economies for which increasing the public good level in a voluntary
contribution economy does not bring about a Pareto improvement. It is evident
that interventions that increase the welfare level of all households involved will
be more desirable from a public policy implementation point of view.
In this paper we take a direct approach to welfare properties of voluntary
provision equilibria in a full blown general equilibrium model with public goods
and study interventions that have the goal of Pareto improving on the voluntary
provision outcome. Towards this end, we elaborate on the general equilibrium
model by Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986). They use a simple general
equilibrium model with only one private good and one public good, and a lin-
ear production technology for the public good using the private good as input.
Those assumptions together imply that there are no relative prices to be de-
termined in equilibrium, the linear coeﬃcient of conversion between the private
and the public good being the only possible equilibrium price. Thus, their model
excludes the possibility of using a powerful channel for intervention, namely the
1See, for example, Cornes and Sandler (1985).
2Andreoni and Bergstrom (1996) study other tax-subsidy mechanisms that can increase
the level of public goods in a model that has the same basic features as that of Bergstrom
et al. (1986). For another line of research where the neutrality results fail to hold, see the
“warm glow” models by Andreoni (1989, 1990).
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changes in relative prices. Therefore, we analyze a model with many private
goods and non-linear, in fact strictly concave production technology for the
public good and, hence, allow for relative price eﬀects. In this setup we show
that Pareto improving interventions generally do exist. In particular, direct
government provision financed by “small”, or “local”, lump-sum taxes can be
used generically to Pareto improve upon the voluntary provision outcome.
Cornes and Sandler (2000), to our knowledge, provide the only other study
that directly addresses the same general question as the one addressed in this
paper. Using the standard one private good, one public good setting with linear
production technology for the public good, they give conditions for achieving
Pareto improvements through a purely redistributive lump-sum tax scheme that
taxes both the contributors and the non-contributors of the original equilibrium.
The intervention they study involves taxes that are not small and they observe
that the possibility of Pareto improvements is positively related to the number
of non-contributors, marginal evaluation of the public good by non-contributors,
and the change in the private provision of public good resulting from an increase
in contributors’ total wealth. The conditions they derive for Pareto-improving
interventions all involve restrictions not on the primitives of their model, but on
the values that some endogenous variables take in equilibrium, such as the sum of
marginal rates of substitution for certain groups of households and “aggregate
contribution response function” for a given set of positive contributors. On
the other hand, our results hold for any number of non-contributors (including
none), for a generic set of exogenous variables (or economies) and for all of the
associated equilibrium values of the endogenous variables.3
The model we study involves profit-maximizing firms producing a public
good using private goods as inputs in a competitive market setting.4 In this
setting we show that the following policy intervention will typically Pareto im-
prove upon the voluntary contribution equilibrium outcome: the public good is
produced by the government, along with private firms, using one of the available
technologies and financing input purchases by taxes on households. This type
of intervention exactly parallel the interventions discussed in literature where
3Hattori (2003) also provides a very partial analysis of Pareto improvements in a model
with rather specific features. His main aim is in fact to provide a demonstration of the
impact of introducing a non-linear production technology in a voluntary public goods supply
model. In his model the government levies a lump-sum tax on individuals and uses the amount
collected to produce the public good under a non-linear technology, while private contributions
are converted to public good through a linear technology. He shows in this setting that there
exists a range of taxes for which there will be less than one-to-one crowding-out of government
provision (i.e., the public good level can be increased by government intervention). He also
shows that increases in the public good level is associated with increases in the utility of
all those who contribute. In the case where everyone is a contributor, that implies that the
government will be able to achieve a Pareto improvement.
4Note that when non-constant returns to scale in production are allowed, modeling of how
the public good is produced in a private provision economy becomes a crucial preliminary issue
to be resolved, both from the production technology and the market institutional viewpoints.
See Villanacci and Zenginobuz (forthcoming) for an extensive discussion of these issues. See
Villanacci and Zenginobuz (2005a) for a voluntary contribution model where the public good
is produced by a public firm operating under a break-even budget constraint.
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complete neutralization, or crowding out, of government policies have been ob-
tained.5
Note that the intervention studied will coexist along with private provision
of public goods. The cases we cover include using taxes only on the households
contributing strictly positive amounts towards the public good, which is the case
where the existing standard neutrality results on the amount of public good
produced apply with full force. Thus, even when private financing of public
goods is taken as a given institutional assumption, we show that there exists
a standard type of intervention involving government provision of public good
via lump-sum taxation that Pareto improves upon the equilibrium outcome.
Therefore, a general non-neutrality result (in terms of utilities) holds, and this is
the case even when all households are strict contributors to the public good. This
result has no direct or indirect counterpart in the one private good, one public
good with linear production technology framework, since there interventions
that involve only the contributing households are neutralized in equilibrium.
The approach we use to prove our results is based on diﬀerential techniques,
which amount to computing the derivative of the equilibrium values of the “goal
function” - the household welfare levels - with respect to some policy tools - taxes
and/or government’s direct provision of the public good, the derivative being
computed at the no intervention values of the policy tools. In other words, we
study small possible changes away from the “no policy intervention scenario”.6
The plan of our paper is as follows. In Section 2, we present the set up
of the model and the existence and regularity results proved by Villanacci and
Zenginobuz (2005c). In Section 3, we first show that interventions that increase
the public good level need not be Pareto improving. We then present and
analyze the intervention we consider to improve households’ welfare. Section 4
provides some concluding remarks. The proof of our main result is presented in
the Appendix.7
2 The Model
We consider a general equilibrium model with private provision of a public
good.8
There are C, C ≥ 1, private commodities, labelled by c = 1, 2, ..., C. There
are H households, H > 1, labelled by h = 1, 2, ...,H. Let H = {1, ...,H} denote
the set of households. Let xch denote consumption of private commodity c by
5 It would be possible to apply our approach to other forms of intervention in order that a
policy maker could choose the one more suitable for the institutional and political environment
under consideration. See a preliminary version of this paper for a detailed analysis of an
intervention involving taxes on firms and households (Villanacci and Zenginobuz, 2005b).
6Therefore, all our arguments are “local” in their nature. We also note that all our non-
neutrality results hold only typically - i.e. for almost all the economies - in the relevant space
of economies.
7A more detailed version of the paper, containing even the most elementary proofs, is
available upon request from the authors.
8The presence of more than one public good can easily be incorporated into our model,
leaving the basic results unchanged.
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household h; ech embodies similar notation for the endowment in private goods.
The following notation is also used: x ≡ (xh)Hh=1 ∈ RCH++ , where xh ≡ (xch)Cc=1;.
e ≡ (eh)Hh=1 ∈ RCH++ , where eh ≡ (ech)Cc=1; p ≡ (pc)Cc=1, where pc is the price of
private good c; bp ≡ (p, pg), where pg is the price of the public good; g ≡ (gh)Hh=1,
where gh ∈ R+ is the amount of public good that consumer h provides; G ≡PH
h=1 gh and G\h ≡ G− gh.
The preferences over the private goods and the public good of household
h are represented by a utility function uh : RC++ × R++ → R. Note that
households’ preferences are defined over the total amount of the public good,
i.e., we have uh : (xh, G) 7→ uh (xh,G).
Assumption 1 For each h, uh is a smooth, diﬀerentiably strictly increasing
(i.e., for every (xh, G) ∈ RC+1++ , Duh(xh, G) À 0)9 , diﬀerentiably strictly
concave function (i.e., for every (xh, G) ∈ RC+1++ , D2uh(xh,G) is negative
definite), and for each u ∈ Imuh the closure in the standard topology of
RC+1 of the set
©
(xh, G) ∈ RC+1++ : uh (xh, G) ≥ u
ª
is contained in RC+1++ .
There are F firms, indexed by subscript f, that use a production technology
represented by a transformation function tf : RC+1 → R, where tf :
³
yf , y
g
f
´
7→
tf
³
yf , y
g
f
´
.
Assumption 2 For each f , tf
³
yf , y
g
f
´
is a C2, diﬀerentiably strictly decreas-
ing (i.e., Dtf
³
yf , y
g
f
´
¿ 0 ), and diﬀerentiably strictly concave (i.e.,
D2tf
³
yf , y
g
f
´
is negative definite) function, with tf (0) = 0.
For each f , define byf ≡ ³yf , ygf´, by ≡ (byf )Ff=1 and Yf ≡ ©byf ∈ RC+1 : tf (byf ) ≥ 0ª,
t ≡ (tf )Ff=1 and bp ≡ (p, pg).
The following assumption is standard to get existence of equilibria.
Assumption 2’ If w ∈
PF
f=1 Yf and w ≥ 0, then w = 0.
Using the convention that input components of the vector byf are negative
and output components are positive, the profit maximization problem for firm
f is: For given bp ∈ RC+1++ ,
Max
?yf∈RC+1
bpbyf s.t. tf (byf ) ≥ 0 (1)
From Assumption 2, it follows that if problem (1) has a solution, it is unique
and it is characterized by Kuhn-Tucker (in fact, Lagrange) conditions.
Let sfh be the share of firm f owned by household h. sf ≡ (sfh)Hh=1 ∈ RH
and s ≡ (sf )Ff=1 ∈ RFH . The set of all shares of each firm f is S ≡ {sf ∈
9For vectors y, z, y ≥ z (resp. y À z) means every element of y is not smaller (resp.
strictly larger) than the correponding element of z; y > z means that y ≥ z but y 6= z.
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[0, 1]H :
PH
h=1 sfh = 1}. s ≡ (sf )Ff=1 ∈ SF . The set of shares sh ≡ (sfh)Ff=1 of
household h is [0, 1]F .
Note that sfh ∈ [0, 1] denotes the proportion of profits of firm f owned by
household h. The definition of S simply requires each firm to be completely
owned by some households.
Household’s maximization problem is then the following: For given bp ∈
RC+1++ , sh ∈ [0, 1]
F , eh ∈ RC++, G\h ∈ R+, by ∈ R(C+1)F ,
Max
(xh,gh)∈RC++×R
uh
¡
xh, gh +G\h
¢
s.t. −p (xh − eh)− pggh + bpPFf=1 sfhbyf ≥ 0
gh ≥ 0
(2)
From Assumption 1, it follows that problem (2) has a unique solution charac-
terized by Kuhn-Tucker conditions.
The set of all utility functions of household h that satisfy Assumption 1
is denoted by Uh; the set of all transformation functions of firm f that satisfy
Assumption 2 is denoted by Tf . Moreover define U ≡ ×Hh=1Uh and T ≡ ×Ff=1Tf .
Assumption 3 Assume that U and T are endowed with the subspace topology
of the C3 uniform convergence topology on compact sets10 ,11 .
Definition 1 An economy is a vector π ≡ (e, s, u, t) ∈ Π ≡ RCH++ ×SF ×U × T .
Observe that the market clearing condition for one good, say good C, is
redundant. Moreover, the price of that good can be normalized without aﬀecting
the budget constraints of any household. With little abuse of notation, we
denote the normalized private and public good prices with p ≡
¡
p\, 1
¢
and pg,
respectively.
We are now able to give the following definition:
Definition 2 A vector (x, g, p\, pg, by) is an equilibrium for an economy π ∈ Π
if:
1. firms maximize, i.e., for each f , byf solves problem (1) at bp ∈ RC+1++ ;
2. households maximize, i.e., for each h , (xh, gh) solves problem (2) at p\ ∈
RC−1++ , pg ∈ R++, eh ∈ RC++, G\h ∈ R+, sh ∈ [0, 1]
F , by ∈ R(C+1)F ; and
10A sequence of functions fn whose domain is an open set O of Rm converges to f if and
only if fn, Dfn, D2fnand D3fn uniformly converge to f , Df , D2f and D3f respectively,
on any compact subset of O.
11 In the proof of existence of equilibria the fact that utility and transformation functions
are C2 suﬃces. We need the stronger form presented in Assumption 3 to get our main result
which needs the application of the Transversality Theorem to a function whose components
contain the Hessian of utility and transformation functions.
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3. markets clear , i.e., (x, g, by) solves
−
PH
h=1 x
\
h +
PH
h=1 e
\
h +
PF
f=1 y
\
f = 0
−
PH
h=1 gh +
PF
f=1 y
g
f = 0
(3)
where for each h and f , x\h ≡ (xch)c6=C , e
\
h ≡ (ech)c6=C ∈ R
C−1
++ and y
\
f ≡³
ycf
´
c 6=C
∈ RC−1.
By the definition of uh, observe that we must have
P
h gh > 0 and, therefore
(i) since gh ≥ 0 for all h, there exists h0 such that gh0 > 0; and (ii)
PF
f=1 y
g
f > 0.
That is, there will exist at least one contributor to the public good and, hence,
there will be a strictly positive level of public good production. Note household
h is called a contributor if gh > 0, and a non-contributor if gh = 0.
Given our assumptions, we can now characterize equilibria in terms of the
system of Kuhn-Tucker conditions to problems (1) and (2), and market clearing
conditions (3).
Define
ξ ≡
³by, α, x, g, µ, λ, p\, pg´ ∈ Ξ ≡ R(C+1)F×RF++×RCH++×RH×RH×RH++×RC−1++ ×R++
and
F : Ξ×Π→ RdimΞ, F : (ξ, π) 7→ left hand side of (4) below
...
(p, pg) + αfDtf
³
yf , y
g
f
´
= 0
tf
³
yf , y
g
f
´
= 0
..
Dxhuh
¡
xh, gh +G\h
¢
− λhp = 0
Dghuh
¡
xh, gh +G\h
¢
− λhpg + µh = 0
min {gh, µh} = 0
−p (xh − eh)− pggh + bpPFf=1 sfhbyf = 0
..
−
PH
h=1 x
\
h +
PH
h=1 e
\
h +
PF
f=1 y
\
f = 0
−
PH
h=1 gh +
PF
f=1 y
g
f = 0
(4)
where αf and λh, µh are the Kuhn-Tucker multipliers associated to the firm and
the household’s maximization problems.
Observe that
¡by, x, g, p\, pg¢ is an equilibrium associated with an economy
π if and only if there exists (α, µ, λ) such that F ¡by, α, x, g, µ, λ, p\, pg, π¢ = 0.
With innocuous abuse of terminology, we will call ξ ≡
¡by, α, x, g, µ, λ, p\, pg¢ an
equilibrium.
Using a homotopy argument applied to the above function, Villanacci and
Zenginobuz (2005c) prove the existence of equilibria.
Theorem 3 For every economy π ∈ Π, an equilibrium exists.
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Villanacci and Zenginobuz (2005c) also show that there is a large set of the
endowments (the so-called regular economies) for which associated equilibria are
finite in number, and that equilibria change smoothly with respect to endow-
ments. Theorem 4 below summarizes their generic regularity results. To this
end, the set of utility functions need to be restricted to a “large and reasonable”
subset eU of U :
Assumption 4 For all h, xh ∈ RC++ and G ∈ R++, it is the case that
det
∙
Dxhxhuh (xh, G) [Dxhuh (xh, G)]
T
DGxhuh (xh, G) DGuh (xh, G)
¸
6= 0. (5)
Let eUh be the subset of Uh satisfying Assumption 4 and define eU ≡ ×Hh=1 eUh
and eΠ ≡ RCH++ × SF × eU × T .
Assumption 4 has an easy and appealing economic interpretation. It is easy
to see that it is equivalent to the public good being a normal good, as long as
the household is a contributor.
Now define
pr
(s,u,t) :
¡F
(s,u,t)
¢−1
(0)→ RCH++ , pr(s,u,t) : (ξ, e) 7→ e,
that is, pr
(s,u,t) is the projection of the equilibrium manifold onto the endowment
space. We then have the following result:
Theorem 4 For each (s, u, t) ∈ SF × eU × T , there exists an open and full
measure subset R of RCH++ such that ∀e ∈ R
1. there exists r ∈ N such that F−1(s,u,t,e) (0) =
©
ξi ≡
¡byi, αi, xi, gi, µi, λi, p\i, pgi¢ªr
i=1
;
moreover, there exist an open neighborhood Y of e in RCH++ , and for each i
an open neighborhood Ui of
¡
ξi, e
¢
in
¡F
(s,u,t)
¢−1
(0), such that Uj∩Uk = ∅
if j 6= k, ¡pr
(s,u,t)
¢−1
(Y ) = ∪ri=1Ui and pr(s,u,t)|Ui : Ui → Y is a diﬀeo-
morphism;
∀ξi ∈ F−1(s,u,t,e) (0),
2. DF(s,u,t,e)
¡
ξi
¢
has full row rank;
3. ∀h, either gih > 0 or µih > 0;
4. ∀i and ∀f ,
³
yf , y
g
f
´
6= 0.12
The Theorem says that typically - i.e., for almost all the economies - (1)
the number of equilibria are finite and, locally, equilibrium variables change
smoothly as the endowments change; (2) a crucial rank condition holds; (3) no
12The proof of results 1, 2 and 3 in the Theorem is contained in Villanacci and Zenginobuz
(2005c). Part 4 can be proven using the same strategy followed there.
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household h is at the “border line case” gh = 0 and µh = 0, and therefore,
by continuity, small enough changes in endowments do not change the set of
contributors; and (4) firms are active in equilibrium. Results (1) and (3) are
of importance in themselves and are used extensively in the next sections. The
more technical result (3) is used in proving Lemma 6; result (4) in the proof of
Theorem 7.
3 Pareto-improving Interventions
3.1 On increasing the public good level and Pareto im-
proving
As we stated in the Introduction, contrary to what seems to have been implicitly
assumed in most of the models studied in the literature, increasing the level of
public good at a voluntary contribution equilibrium is not suﬃcient to guarantee
a Pareto superior outcome. The first result we present below shows that there
is in general no relationship between the change in the voluntary contribution
level of public good brought about by a government intervention and the change
in the utility levels of households. Hence the emphasis placed on increasing the
public good level in voluntary contribution models is misplaced to the extent
that increasing the public good level is taken as an indicator of utility increase for
all. In the main result of the paper that we present in the following subsection,
we show that there do exist interventions that will lead to a Pareto superior
outcome for a generic set of economies. The Pareto improving interventions work
their eﬀect typically through changing relative prices. In general the increase in
the total level of public good is neither required for Pareto improvement nor is
it implied by it.
Before we present our first result, it will be useful to mention a property of
private provision equilibria that will allow us to restrict taxation of contribut-
ing households to taxing only one of the contributing households. We already
observed above that, for each economy and each associated equilibrium, our
assumptions imply the existence of at least one contributing household, while
nothing is implied about the number of non-contributing households (which
may possibly be zero). Villanacci and Zenginobuz (forthcoming) show that, us-
ing appropriate redistributions among contributors only, each private provision
equilibrium with only one contributor being taxed can be obtained from each
equilibrium with more than one contributor being taxed (see their Theorem 5
and Proposition 6). Making use of this result, we consider taxes or subsidies on
only one contributor in the results we present below.
Theorem 5 There exists an open and dense subset S∗ of the set of the economies
for which there exist at least two non-contributors such that ∀π ∈ S∗ and for
any associated equilibrium, there exists a redistribution among one contributor
and two non-contributors which leads to independent changes in the level of
public good G and the utility of a non-contributor.
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In more intuitive terms, Theorem 5 says that, typically, there exists a redis-
tribution among contributors and non-contributors in a voluntary contribution
economy which leads to an increase in the level of public good G and a de-
crease in the utility of one household. Thus an increase in G is not suﬃcient for
achieving a Pareto improvement.
The strategy of proof for Theorem 5 is the same as the one employed for the
proof of our main result below (Theorem 7), for which we give a very detailed
proof. We present a more formal statement of Theorem 5 in terms of that
strategy in the Appendix and describe the steps to be followed in proving it in
the same way we prove Theorem 7.
3.2 Pareto improving via public production financed with
taxes on households
The policy we propose involves a direct intervention by the government via
public production financed with taxes on households. The policy we propose
has to involve an intervention beyond pure redistribution of endowments or
incomes for the following intuitive reason. The techniques of proof we use require
that the number of independent policy tools must be at least equal to the
number of policy goals to be achieved.13 Thus, a pure redistribution (of the
numeraire good) among H households, which aims at increasing the utility of
each of these H households, would not work in our case. Pure redistribution
will have to satisfy the constraint
PH
h=1 ρh = 0, where ρh is the tax or subsidy
for household h = 1, ...,H, with the implication that the number of independent
tools is reduced to H − 1, while the number of goals - the utility levels of all
households - is H.
On the other hand, if the planner can directly intervene in the production
side of the economy, then the number of policy tools available is expanded. In
fact, we show that a planner can Pareto improve upon the market outcome if
her intervention is as follows: introduce an endowment (income) tax on some
households and use the tax proceeds to produce the public good directly (along
with private firms) using one of the available production technologies.
Specifically, the government intervention we study involves the following:
1. The planner taxes a contributor, without loss of generality household 1,
by an amount ρ1 of the numeraire good;
2. She uses those taxes to finance the purchase of amounts θ ∈ RC of the
private goods to produce an amount θg of the public good, using one of
the available technologies, say that of private firm 1, implying (θ, θg) is
such that t1 (θ, θ
g) = 0.
Therefore to describe equilibria with planner intervention we have to change
the equilibrium system (4) as follows:
13This is reminiscent of a version of the so called Tinbergen’s theorem (Tinbergen (1956)),
which asserts that to achieve policy goals, the number of policy instruments must exceed the
number of goals. We further discuss this point in the Concluding Remarks section.
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1. For each h, the amount of consumed public good is
¡
gh +G\h
¢
+ θg;
2. The budget set of household 1 has to take into account the tax ρ1;
3. The market clearing conditions have to take into account that the demand
of private goods has increased by θ;
4. The purchase of θ has to be financed with the revenue from tax collection,
i.e.,
ρ1 + pθ = 0 (6)
5. Observe that the change in the amount of public good θg is a “present” to
consumers and it does not go through the market; therefore, it does not
appear in the market clearing condition for the public good.
To formalize the planner’s intervention described above and on the way to
proving our main result, we go through the following three steps14 :
Step (i):
We construct a function whose zeros can be naturally interpreted as equi-
libria with planner’s intervention, and we present the function describing the
planner’s objective.
We first define a new equilibrium function F1, taking into account the plan-
ner’s intervention eﬀects on agents behaviors via the policy tools (ρ1, θ) ∈ RC+2,
as follows:
F1 : Ξ×RC+2 × eΠ→ RdimΞ, F1 : (ξ, ρ1, θ, π) 7→ (left hand side of (7) below)
...
(p, pg) + αfDtf
³
yf , y
g
f
´
= 0
tf
³
yf , y
g
f
´
= 0
...
Dxhuh
¡
xh, gh +G\h + θ
g¢− λhp = 0
Dghuh
¡
xh, gh +G\h + θ
g¢− λhpg + µh = 0
min {gh, µh} = 0
−p (xh − eh)− ρh − pggh + bpPFf=1 sfhbyf = 0
...
−
PH
h=1 x
\
h +
PH
h=1 e
\
h + y
\ + θ\ = 0
−
PH
h=1 gh +
PF
f=1 y
g
f = 0
(7)
where household 1 is a contributor, ρ1 ∈ R and ρh = 0 if and only if h 6= 1. We
then define a function F2, describing the constraints on the planner intervention
F2 : Ξ×RC+2 × eΠ→ R2, F2 : (ξ, ρ1, θ, π) 7→ (ρ1 + pθ, t1 (θ, θg))
14We apply the general approach introduced by Geneakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986),
using the strategy laid out by Cass and Citanna (1998) and Citanna, Kajii and Villanacci
(1998).
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and then consider another function eF ≡ (F1,F2), whose zeros can be naturally
interpreted as equilibria with planner’s intervention. We can partition the vector
(ρ1, θ) of tools into two subvectors θ
∗ ≡ (θc)Cc=1 ∈ RC and (ρ1, θ
g) ∈ R2. The
former can be seen as the vector of independent tools and the latter as the
vector of dependent tools: once the value of the first vector is chosen, the value
of the second one is uniquely determined. Observe that there is a value θ
∗
(and
associated
³
ρ1, θ
g
´
) at which equilibria with and without planner’s intervention
coincide (that value is simply zero).
To formalize the fact that the planner is assumed to Pareto improve upon
the equilibrium outcome, we finally introduce a goal function G defined simply
as
G : Ξ×RC+2 × eΠ→ RH , G : (ξ, ρ1, θ, π) 7→ (uh (xh))Hh=1
The planner’s objective is to increase each household utility level. Therefore,
we want to analyze the local eﬀect of a change in the values of independent tools
(θc)Cc=1 around zero on G when its arguments assume their equilibrium (with
planner intervention) values.
Step (ii):
We construct a function which describes how the values of the goals change
when the values for the policy tools change and variables move in the equilibrium
set defined by eF .
An important step towards construction of that function is provided by the
following lemma.
Lemma 6 For each (s, u, t) ∈ SF × eU × T , there exists an open and full mea-
sure subset R0 of RCH++ such that for every e ∈ R0 and for every ξ such thateF (ξ, (ρ1, θ) = 0, e, s, u, t) = 0,
D(ξ,ρ1,θg)
eF (ξ, 0, π) has full row rank dimΞ+ 2. (8)
Proof. Observe that taking R0 = R, as defined in Theorem 4, will suﬃce.
D(ξ,ρ1,θg)
eF (ξ, 0, π) is computed below
⎡
⎣
DξF1 ... ...
0 1 0
0 0 Dθg t1
⎤
⎦
The desired result follows from the fact that in equilibrium and at ρ = 0,
DξF1 = DξF and from part 2 of Theorem 4.
From the above lemma, it follows that there exists an open and dense subset
Π∗ of eΠ such that for each π ∈ Π∗, condition (8) holds. Then as a consequence
of the Implicit Function Theorem, ∀π ∈ Π∗ and ∀ξ such that F (ξ, π) = 0, that
there exist an open set V ⊆ RC containing θ∗ = 0 and a unique C1 function
h(ξ,π) : V → RdimΞ+2 such that h(ξ,π) (0) = (ξ, (ρ1, θg) = 0), and
for every θ∗ ∈ V, eF ¡h(ξ,π) (θ∗) , θ∗, π¢ = 0
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In words, the function h(ξ,π) describes the eﬀects of local changes of θ
∗ around
0 on the equilibrium values of ξ and (ρ1, θ
g).
For every economy π ∈ Π∗, and every ξ ∈ F−1π (0), we can then define
g(ξ,π) : V ⊆ RC → RH , g(ξ,π) : θ∗ 7→ G
¡
h(ξ,π) (θ
∗) , θ∗, π
¢
In what follows, unless explicitly needed, we will omit the subscript (ξ, π) of the
function g.
Step (iii):
Using the function g above, we give a suﬃcient condition which guarantees
that the changes in the values of policy tools have a non-trivial eﬀect on the
values of the goals.
Technically, this amounts to showing that there exists an open and dense
subset Π∗∗ ⊆ eΠ such that for each π ∈ Π∗∗ and for each associated equilibrium
ξ, the planner can “move” the equilibrium value of the goal function in any
direction locally around g
³
θ
∗´
, the value of the goal function in the case of
no intervention. More formally, we need to show that g is essentially surjective
at θ
∗
, i.e., the image of each open neighborhood of θ
∗
in RC contains an open
neighborhood of g
³
θ
∗´
in RH . A suﬃcient condition15 for that property is
rank
h
Dg(θ
∗
)
i
C×H
= H (9)
Therefore, recalling the distinction between dependent and independent tools
above, we must have
H = # goals ≤ # independent tools = C (10)
We can now state our main result.
Theorem 7 Assume that C ≥ H. There exists an open and dense subset Π∗∗ of
the set eΠ of the economies, such that ∀π ∈ Π∗∗ and ∀ξ ∈ F−1π (0) , the function
g(ξ,π) is essentially surjective at 0.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Theorem 7 says that there typically exist taxes on households and a choice
of production vector using available technology that Pareto improves upon the
pre-intervention equilibrium outcome. Note that the theorem covers the case
where every household is a contributor. This is the case in which it is not
possible to change the level of public good in the standard one private good,
one public good model using local taxes. Thus, the theorem demonstrates a
general non-neutrality result (in terms of utilities) even for the case where the
standard neutrality results on the level of public good holds.
15See, for example, Chapter 1 in Golubitsky and Guillemin (1973).
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4 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we studied a standard government policy and showed that it will
typically Pareto improve upon the private provision (“market”) outcomes in an
economy with public goods - even when the non-cooperative voluntary provision
aspect of the economy is preserved.
In the policy intervention considered, public good is produced by the gov-
ernment (along with private firms) which uses one of the available technologies
and finances production costs with taxes on households. We identified that, for
our Pareto improvement result to go through for a large set of economies, the
number of households (H) is to be smaller than the number of private goods
(C).
We note that, in principle our approach and techniques of proof can equally
be applied to other forms of intervention deemed plausible and desirable; hence
providing a larger set of interventions for a policy maker to choose from accord-
ing to institutional and political constraints of the environment under consider-
ation (see also Footnote 5 above).
The requirement for our main result that the number of commodities is
bigger than the number of households (i.e., C ≥ H) is certainly a strong one.
Several comments are in order to clarify the nature of this requirement and the
role it plays in our model.
First, note that such a requirement is consistent with a version of the so
called Tinbergen’s theorem (Tinbergen (1956)), which asserts that to achieve a
given number of (distinct) policy goals, the number of (distinct) policy instru-
ments used must exceed the number of goals. In our case, since we seek Pareto
improvements, the number of goals is equal to the number of households (H).
Hence the need for H independent policy tools.
Observe also that in a model with T periods (or states of nature), the needed
requirement would become H ≤ CT , a much milder one. If instead of apply-
ing taxes which are good specific, we used good and firm specific taxes, the
requirement would have been of the form H ≤ CF , where F is the number of
existing firms, again a milder condition. Finally, if outside money is introduced
in the model, we conjecture that the requirement could be dispensed of as in
del Mercato and Villanacci (forthcoming).
As a final remark, observe also that taxes on households allowed in the Pareto
improving intervention we studied involve only the contributors. If we allowed
taxes on not only the contributors, but on the non-contributors as well, the
number of tools at the planner’s disposal would have been increased by exactly
the number of non-contributors. In the extreme case where there is only 1
contributing household and H−1 non-contributing households, the requirement
of C ≥ H that we now have would have been replaced by C ≥ 1, which is
always satisfied. Note that there is an open subset of economies in which every
household is a contributor in our model, so the type of taxation we allowed,
namely taxing only the contributors, addresses this open subset of economies.
However, note that there are also open subsets of economies for which, in the
no-intervention equilibria, the number of contributors is strictly less than H.
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Therefore, in our analyses we have been very prudent in terms of number of
independent tools at the discretion of the planner. There are open subsets of
economies for which the requirement in our theorems regarding the relative
number of households and commodities will become more natural.
5 Appendix: On Theorem 5 and the proof of
Theorem 7
5.1 On Theorem 5
Following the strategy of proof described in Section 3.2, we just need to de-
scribe the specific form of the functions F1,F2,G, h, g which is done below. We
distinguish those functions in this case from those of the previous one using an
upper bar.
F1 is the same as in (7) apart from the following aspects: household 1 is
a contributor, households 2 and 4 are non-contributors, ρh 6= 0 if and only if
h 6= 1, 2, 4.16
F2 : Ξ×R2 ×Π→ R, F2 : (ξ, ρ, π) 7→
P
h=1,2,4 ρh
G : Ξ× R2 ×Π→ R, G : (ξ, ρ, π) 7→
³
u4 (x4) ,
PH
h=1 gh
´
Using exactly the same strategy as the one used in Section 3.2, it is easy to
show that there exists an open and dense subset Π
∗
of eΠ such that ∀π ∈ Π∗ and
∀ξ such that F (ξ, π) = 0, there exists a unique C1 function h(ξ,π) describing
the eﬀects of local changes of (ρ1, ρ2) around 0 on the equilibrium values of ξ
and ρ4. Then, ∀π ∈ Π
∗
, and ∀ξ ∈ F−1π (0), we can then define
g(ξ,π) : (ρ1, ρ2) 7→ G
¡
h(ξ,π) (ρ1, ρ2) , (ρ1, ρ2) , π
¢
Then, the formal way of stating Theorem 5 is just in terms of essential
surjectivity of the function g(ξ,π).
Theorem 8 There exists an open and dense subset S∗ of the set of (the economies
for which there exist at least two non-contributors) such that ∀π ∈ S∗ and
∀ξ ∈ F−1π (0) , the function g(ξ,π) is essentially surjective at 0.
5.2 Proof of Theorem 7
Proof of Theorem 7:. We want to show that the statement (9) in Section 3.2
holds in an open and dense subset Π∗∗ of eΠ. Following Cass (1992), a suﬃcient
16As in the previou case, ρh denotes the tax, in terms of the numeraire good, imposed on
household h.
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condition for that is to show that for each π ∈ Π∗∗ the following system has no
solutions (ξ, c) ∈ Ξ×RdimΞ+2+H
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
F (ξ, π) = 0 (1)
c
h
Dξ,ρ1,θ
³ eF ,G´ ¡ξ, ρ1, θ, π¢i = 0 (2)
cc− 1 = 0 (3)
(11)
Towards construction of Π∗∗ ⊆ eΠ, define
M ≡ {(ξ, ρ, θ, π) ∈ Ξ×RC+2 × eΠ : F (ξ, π) = 0 and
rank
h
Dξ,ρ1,θ
³ eF (.) ,G (, )´i < dimΞ+ 2 +H}
and
pr : F−1 (0)→ eΠ, pr : (ξ, π) 7→ π
and let Π∗∗ = eΠ \ pr (M).
For openness of Π∗∗, it suﬃces to show that pr is proper, which implies that
pr (M) is closed. The proof of properness follows from a similar compactness
proof contained in Theorem 12, Step 4 in Villanacci and Zenginobuz (2005c).
To show denseness of Π∗∗, define the function
F∗ : Ξ×RdimΞ+2+H × eΠ→ RdimΞ ×RdimΞ++2+H ×R
F∗ : (ξ, c, π) 7→ left hand side of system (11)
As an application of a finite dimensional version of Parametric Transversality
Theorem, the denseness result is established by showing that 0 is a regular value
for F∗.17 More precisely, since π is an element of the infinite dimensional seteΠ, we choose to look at a finite dimensional subset (submanifold)18 of that
set parametrized by a vector a, taking advantage of the generic regularity of
equilibria. The construction of the parametrization used is as follows.
We use a finite local parameterization of both the utility and the transfor-
mation functions.19 For the former, we are going to use the following form:
uh (xh, gh) = uh (xh, gh) + ((xh, gh)− (x∗h, g∗h))
T Ah ((xh, gh)− (x∗h, g∗h))
with
Ah ≡
∙
Axx,h 0
0 agg,h
¸
where uh ∈ eUh, (x∗h, g∗h) are equilibrium values, Axx,h is a symmetric negative
definite matrix, and agg,h is a strictly negative number. It is well known that
uh ∈ Uh; the fact that uh ∈ eUh can be shown using the same line of reasoning.
17Observe that the dimension of the domain of F∗ is smaller than the dimension of its
codomain.
18 In fact, we construct a local finite parametrization of utility and transformation functions.
19For further details on the content of this appendix, see Cass and Citanna (1998) and
Citanna, Kaji and Villanacci (1998).
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The finite local parameterization of the transformation function we are going to
use has the following form:
tf
³
yf , y
g
f
´
= tf
³
yf , y
g
f
´
+
³³
yf , y
g
f
´
−
³³
y∗f , y
g∗
f
´´´T
· bAf ·³³yf , ygf´− ³³y∗f , yg∗f ´´´
where tf ∈ T ,
³
y∗f , y
g∗
f
´
are equilibrium values, and bAf is a symmetric negative
definite matrix. Observe that the above transformation functions do satisfy all
the maintained assumption. The main ingredient of the proof is to use the fact
that generically in equilibrium firms are active, which is the content of Part
4 in Theorem 4. Checking that the aggregate production set W ≡
PF
f=1 Yf ,
modified consistently with the choice of the above transformation function, does
satisfy Assumption 2’ amounts to the use of a separating hyperplane argument.
We can then define a ≡
³
(ah, agg,h)
H
h=1 , (baf )Ff=1´, where (ah, agg,h) and baf are
the vectors of distinct elements of the symmetric matrices Ah, for h = 1, ...,H,
and bAf , for f = 1, ..., F , respectively.
Using the parametrizations described, we redefine the functions F , eF , G,
and F∗ by replacing eU × T in their domain with a open ball bA in a finite
Euclidean space with generic element a. Call FA, eFA, GA, and F∗A the functions
so obtained. We can then rewrite (11) as F∗A (ξ, c, e, s, a) = 0, i.e.,
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
F (ξ, e, s, a) = 0 (1)
c
h
D(ξ,ρ1,θg)
³ eF ,G´ ¡ξ, ρ1, θ, e, s, a¢i = 0 (2)
cc− 1 = 0 (3)
(12)
We are then left with showing that 0 is a regular value for F∗A, i.e., either
F∗A (ξ, c, e, s, a) = 0 has no solutions (ξ, c) for all values of (e, s, a) (13)
or,
for each (ξ, c, e, s, a) ∈ (F∗A)−1 (0), DF∗A (ξ, c, e, s, a) has full row rank (14)
In the table below, the components of F∗A (ξ, c, e, s, a) are listed in the first
column, the variables with respect to which derivatives are taken are listed in
the first row.
ξ c , a
FA (ξ, e, s, a) DξFA (ξ, c, e, s, a) B (ξ, c, e, s, a)
c
h
D(ξ,ρ1,θg)
³ eFA,GA´ ¡ξ, ρ1, θ, e, s, a¢i
cc− 1
∗ M (ξ, c, e, s, a)
(15)
From generic regularity, i.e., Theorem 4, DξF (ξ, e, s, a) has full row rank in an
open and dense subset of RCH++ × SF × bA (and of eΠ). By the very choice of
17
the finite parametrization of the economy space, B (ξ, c, ω, a) = 0. Therefore,
to show condition (14) above, it is enough to show that the following holds
for each (ξ, c, e, s, a) ∈ (F∗A)−1 (0) ,
M (ξ, c, e, s, a) ≡
" h
D(ξ,ρ1,θg)
³ eFA,GA´ ¡ξ, ρ1, θ, e, s, a¢iT N (a)
c 0
#
has full rank
(16)
We are then left with showing that either condition (13) or condition (16) does
hold.
We present the rest of the proof for the subset of economies in which all
households are contributors.20 In what follows, we write the relevant equations
of system (12) and the matrix M (ξ, c, e, s, a), see system (18) and the table in
(19) below, respectively. The key ingredient in all of the above, i.e. the matrix
D(ξ,ρ1,θg)
³ eFA,G´ ¡ξ, ρ1, θ, e, s, a¢, is displayed below. Observe that household 1
is taxed and household h 6= 1 is not taxed. As was explained for the table in (15)
in Section (3.2), the components of
³ eFA,G´ are listed in the first column, the
variables with respect to which derivatives are taken are listed in the first row.
The new entries of the table are just the partial Jacobians of the component
functions of the corresponding super-row with respect to the elements in the
20This is the case where, on the basis of the neutrality result by Blume, Bergstrom and
Varian (1986) described in the Introduction, achieving Pareto improving interventions would
seem to be the most diﬃcult.
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